Introduction
In this paper, we empirically investigate the link between capital structure and auditors' perceptions of firm value in pricing their services. The paper argues that capital structure emits signals to auditors that influences auditors in their pricing decision. This paper thus proposes that the composition of firms' capital structure is likely to send signals to auditors of firms. There are related business risks 1 involved in using debt or equity to finance an entity. Overall, business risks can endanger the firm's ability to achieve shareholder-value maximisation or endanger the going concern of firms.
The distinguishing features of debt and equity are briefly considered here. Generally, debts are associated with the following properties (1) a commitment to settle future fixed periodic interest payments (this takes away future cash flows from stockholders); (2) the fixed periodic payments are tax deductible for the debt issuer (e.g., Ross, 1977 ) (this means that interest charges on debt will be deducted from income before the remaining income is taxed); (3) loss of control by the debt issuer in case of its inability to pay periodic interests, or principal or both. Auditors are likely to consider these factors of debt side-by-side with those of equity in their pricing decisions. Some debts are a senior claimant to a firm's earnings. Debt is a "two-edged sword" because it disciplines managers in the use of resources. Some managers who have large amount of unused cash flows can be extravagant if their debt portfolio is low. On the other hand, a debt issuer faces direct costs such as legal and other deadweight costs. A debt issuer also faces indirect costs such as credibility or creditworthiness, loss sales, bankruptcy and liquidation costs in the event of a default. The debt issuer can also lose financial flexibility and the ability to obtain future favourable terms from suppliers. A downside of equity is that cash flows on equity such as dividends are not tax deductible for a firm. Another downside of equity is that agency problems between equity holders and managers of firm is higher than the case of debt. Relative to debt, the greater the separation between stockholders and managers the higher the agency costs.
It is asserted that increasing quantum of equity and debt increases the market's perception of value or risk.
Research evidence (e.g., Byoun and Xu, 2013) has shown that a firm might issue more equity after it has established a good reputation about its stock. The firm might also fallback on equity financing if it discovers that it is unable to issue debt at attractive terms. For firms that issue equity, dividends payments are not mandatory as they pay whenever they can afford to do so, which makes equity investors uncertain of returns from their investment. Some of the upsides of equity financing can be captured as follows: 1) firms that use equity do not have to repay equity capital to their stockholders; 2) failure to repay equity capital to stockholders will not result to loss of control of the firm; 3) equity holders have the voting right of the firm, so that they control the firms.
Generally, auditors can be concerned with the firm value or risk associated with capital structure. It is plausible to argue that auditors can be affected by their perceptions of firm values or risks as conveyed by financial structure of firms in the auditors pricing decisions. In other words, financial structure is likely to signal potential values or risks to auditors when pricing their services. This paper, therefore, draws upon financial structure signalling theory (e.g., Ross, 1977; Riley, 2001) , which posits that the choice of a financial structure can signal information to the market, including the audit pricing market.
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) theory posits that capital structure is irrelevant under certain conditions including those of no taxes, homogenous investor expectations, no default risk or agency costs, and a perfect capital market. In real life, some of these conditions are not obtainable except the one relating to taxes in which case in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and probably a few other countries, there are no taxes. Because these conditions do not hold in reality, auditors may consider firms capital structure in pricing their services.
Myers (1984)'s pecking order theory argues that firms follow a financing hierarchy by first financing themselves through retained earnings, followed by debt and then issuing of new equity.
If auditors follow this theory, it then means that firms that issue securities may not have enough retained earnings. Auditors may perceive these firms to be precarious or value-reducing, and therefore price their services highly. The lower the auditors' perceived value of firms and their capital structure, the higher the pricing. This leads to the main expectation of the paper, which is that capital structure relates positively to auditors' perceptions about the value of firms through the pricing of auditors' services. In addition, and decomposing the financial structure, auditors' price is likely to relate more to equity financing than to debt financing, so that we expect a significant relationship between auditors' price and equity financing but not for debt financing, given that firms are already financed by equity.
In the study, we collect data of 311 firm-year observations of non-finance firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) covering the period 2012-2015. The data were analysed using panel data analysis methodology. Pooled OLS regression results suggest that financial structure is positively related to auditors' price. We find that equity, but not debt, is significantly related to auditors' price. These results hold after controlling for auditor type. The positive relations suggest lower perceptions of firm value (hence high risk) by auditors, thereby making firms to pay higher auditors' price. This suggests that auditors penalise equity financed firms more than debt financed firms, probably because auditors interpret equity financing as firms' inability to raise debt. We, therefore, conclude that firms' financial structure conveys signals to auditors in their pricing decisions. Based on these findings, we recommend that auditors should monitor the capital structure of their client-firms to guide them in charging prices for their services. Further, we recommend that corporate managers should rebalance their firms' capital structure cognisant of the fact that auditors are taking a cue from it.
One contribution of the paper is that it attempts to kindle future research interest on the relation between auditors' perceptions of firm value and financial structure. Another specific contribution of the paper is that it provides a link between corporate finance and auditing. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of prior works that studied the relation between capital structure and auditors' pricing, especially in the Nigerian context. The remainder of the paper goes as follows. The next section is a review of related literature. It also develops the paper's hypotheses. The third section addresses data and empirical method used to test the hypotheses. The fourth section presents the empirical results of the paper while the fifth section concludes, with two recommendations. 
Capital structure
In its broad interpretation, capital structure consists mainly of shareholders' equity and long-term debts (see Modigliani and Miller 1958) . We shall modify this broad interpretation of capital structure in section 2 of this paper. Prior study (e.g., Byoun and Xu, 2013) find that there is a comparative advantage in issuing equity to issuing debt. It will be interesting to investigate whether this comparative advantage reveals itself in the perception of auditors in pricing their services. It is argued that issuing debt to substitute equity increases the value of the firm (Ross, 1977) . It is also argued that firms that use debt finance reallocate some expected future cash flows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up-front (Frank and Goyal, 2009 Simunic (1980) have examined the effect of debt on aspects of the firm. Knechel et al. (2008) argue that the choice of auditors is positively associated with a firm's leverage. Ghosh (2007) argues that highly levered firms are more intensely exposed to market monitoring, which including monitoring by auditors. Modigliani and Miller (1958) find that total value of firms depends on firms' capital structure. However, for the individual firm, Modigliani and Miller (1958) find that firm value is independent of financial structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that capital structure has an impact on companies' profitability. Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) assert that the market value of an individual firm is independent of its capital structure, Ross (1977) argues that in a cross-section of firms, value should increase with the substitution of debt for equity financing because of the tax advantage of the former. Our paper is a cross-sectional study, and we want to it align with Ross (1977) .
In spite of the argument that capital structure matters in the perception of auditors, it appears that extant literature has hitherto failed to investigate the relationship between capital structure and auditors' beliefs about the value of their client-firms. In addition, the literature review undertaken in this paper suggests that there are scanty studies on the signaling effect of capital structure in developing economies. The purpose of our study, therefore, is to fill the gap in existing literature. Fields et al. (2004) argue that audit fees should be increasing in the client's level of capital risk 1 . Changes in the financial structure can change auditors' perceptions of the value of firms. As saw above, Ross (1977) argues that issuing debt to substitute equity increases the value of the firm. Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that when firms use debt finance, they are reallocating some expected future cash flows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up-front. Modigliani and Miller (1958) find that total value of firms depends on firms' capital structure. Frank and Goyal (2009) opine that equity has a serious adverse selection whereas debt has a minor adverse selection. The authors argue that from outside investors' point of view, equity is riskier than debt so that a drop in valuation of equities makes them appear undervalued. Between debt and equity, it appears that there is mix argument of which most affects capital structure risk and firm value. We expect higher equity to attract higher prices by auditors. This leads to our first hypothesis that:
Development of hypotheses
Hypothesis 1, H1: Equity has a significant positive relationship with auditors' price.
Ghosh (2007) argues that firms that have high debt are more intensely exposed to market monitoring. According to Ross (1977) , by using debt the manager creates an instrument which is priced in the market. From outside investors' point of view, a firm that has more debt faces greater risk than a firm that does not; so that we expect higher debt to attract higher prices by auditors. This leads to our second hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 2, H2: Debt has a significant positive relationship with auditors' price.
Data and methodology

Data collection and method
We collect the research data of IFRS-compliant year-end online financial statements of non-finance firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2012-2015.
Prior to 2012, most Nigerian companies were using homegrown accounting standards known as Statement of Accounting Standards, SAS. The phased implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Nigeria guides us in our efforts to collect data for this study. Phase 1 is the first of the three implementation phases. It required all significant public entities whose securities are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange to adopt IFRS from periods ending after 1 January 2012. SAS is not the same as IFRS, so that we find it appropriate to compare likes with likes. Because we wanted all the firms to be IFRS-compliant we took 2012 as the beginning of our data collection period because most significant public entities in Nigeria started complying with IFRS from that year onwards. We ended 
Method
We specify the general model specification as,
where Ý is dependent variable, and X i s are the components of capital structure consisting mainly of shareholders' equity and long-term debt, following Modigliani and Miller (1958) . In its fully specified form according to the paper's research variables, equation (1) becomes,
where PRICE is auditors' price, which is a proxy for auditors' perceptions of, or belief about, the risk of a firm. The higher the auditors' perceived risk, the higher the auditors' pricing. MODEQ is modified equity, TLTD is total long-term debt. γ is control for auditor type. H is an error term, i.i.d normally distributed with mean 0. Exante, we expect β 1 and β 2 > 0. As used in this paper, equation (2) does not imply causality but reflects the association between capital structure and auditors' price.
We use modified equity to proxy shareholders' equity. We calculate modified equity in this paper as ordinary share capital plus preference share capital plus share premium plus other reserves plus retained earnings minus share based payment reserves minus foreign exchange translation reserves minus non-controlling interests. That is,
Modified equity = (ordinary share capital + preference share capital + share premium + other reserves + retained earnings) -(share based payment reserves -foreign exchange translation reservesnon-controlling interests)
Other reserves include capital reserve, revenue reserve, and revaluation reserve. Total Long-term debt (TLTD) includes long-term loans and long-term borrowings plus debenture loans plus and finance lease obligations minus deferred tax liabilities minus deferred income minus employee retirement benefit obligations minus provisions for liabilities and contingent liabilities. That is,
Total long-term debt = (long-term loans + long-term borrowings + debenture loans + finance lease obligations) -(deferred tax liabilities -deferred incomeemployee retirement benefit obligations -provisions for liabilities -contingent liabilities)
Altogether, we run five OLS panel regressions of equation (2) on the SPSS software. Specifically, we run yearly regressions of 2012 to 2015 (with 63, 80, 90, and 78 firms, respectively). We also run a combined or pooled OLS regression of the 311 firm-year observations. All the regressions are run either with or without auditor type, γ, which is the control variable. In addition to statistical analysis, we interpret the coefficient estimates of modified equity vis-à-vis coefficient estimates of total long-term debt to infer their respective economic impact on auditors' price.
Empirical results
The descriptive statistics of the research variables are presented in Table 1 . All values relating to modified equity, total long-term debts and auditors' price are in thousands. Some of the 63 firms in 2012 have negative modified equity of N3,430,000,000, and maximum (mean) modified equity of N414,957,568,000 (N20,336,064,540). In 2013, modified equity is negative, and increased to N4,608,386,000, with maximum (average) of N550,282,848,000 (N21,887,755,310). In 2014, modified equity is negative at N192,609,812,000 while the maximum (average) is N591,577,690,000 (N18,256,430,220). The 78 firms examined in 2015 have minimum modified equity of (-N228,339,355,000) and maximum (average) of N224,942,000,000 (N10,821,431,220). Respective values of total long-term debt and auditors' price over the period can be found in the remaining part of (2-tailed) . Table no . 3 are similar to the bivariate correlations reported so far. There is a significant positive moderate correlation between auditors' price and modified equity (rho = .144, ρ < .05) but not between auditors' price and total long-term debt (rho = .088, ρ > .01). There is no significant correlation between total long-term debt and modified equity; in fact, the correlation is negative (rho = .002). This implies, as expected, that an increase in either the debt or equity component reduces the other.
The partial correlations in
The correlations provide prima facie supports for the two hypotheses of the paper, which are that equity and debt (or financial structure) has positive relationship with auditors' price. The correlation between auditors' price and equity is significant as hypothesised but it is not significant for debt. Given the low correlations between the predictor variables, and the variable inflation factors which are within acceptable limits of less than 10 (e.g., Hair et al., 2009) , multicollinearity between the two research variables is not a problem. 
Panel data regression results
Result of the five OLS panel regressions are conveyed in the tables that follow. 
Pooled regression result
Next, we present the OLS pooled regression results that combine all the yearly data into a single regression. We do this to test the paper's hypotheses. The results are shown in Table no . 5. It can be seen that modified equity (MODEQ) is significantly positively related to auditors' price (PRICE) whereas total long-term debt (TLTD) is not significant although it has the predicted sign. Both controlling and not controlling for auditor type, γ, modified equity (MODEQ) is significant (marginal) at the 1% levels, but clearly at the 5% level. In economic terms, a one unit increase in MODEQ increases overall auditors' price by 15.50% in panel A and 14.50% in panel B. Notice that the control variable has negative relationship with auditors' price. This result further demonstrates that auditor type (γ) does not moderate auditors' price and financial structure. In effect, in their pricing, it appears that, on average, that auditors are influenced by the composition of debt (TLTD) and equity (MODEQ) in the capital structure of firms irrespective of the type of auditors. Addressing the tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2), this result confirms that equity has a significant positive relationship with auditors' price (H1). Debt is not significantly related to auditors' price, although the sign is as predicted in (H2). These tests on H1 and H2 demonstrate that capital structure is positively related to auditors' price, although equity financing incurs significantly higher pricing by auditors than debt financing. These results hold even after controlling for auditor type. This finding is consistent with Asien (2015), who finds that financial risk is positively related to auditors' remuneration or audit fees. We infer from this finding that auditors penalise equity financing more than debt financing, probably because auditors perceive equity financing as firms' inability to raise debt. This inference is buttressed by the pecking order theory (see Myers, 1984; and Goyal, 2003, 2005) , which views equity financing is a last resort.
The values of the firms may have suffered (indicating higher risk) since they have resorted to equity financing. This finding is also consistent with the case of the banking industry where Fields et al. (2004) found a positive and significant relationship between risk-adjust capital ratio and audit fees. They interpret their finding to indicate that auditors charge more to audit banks that are required by regulators to maintain higher levels of regulatory capital. We interpreted these findings to mean that capital structure contains signals that are priced by the auditor market. The positive relation suggests lower perceptions of firm value (or higher perception of firm risk) by auditors, hence firms pay higher auditors' prices. The paper thus concludes that firms' financial structure conveys signals to auditors in their pricing decisions.
Conclusion and recommendations
In this paper, we empirically investigate the link between financial structure and auditors' perceptions of firm value (or risk) through the pricing of auditors' services. The paper draws upon capital structure signalling theory (Ross, 1977; Riley, 2001 ). We expect firms' capital structure to relate positively with auditors' price as a sign of low auditors' perceptions of firm value, or high perception of firm risk. We use panel data analysis methodology to analyse data of 311 firmyear observations of IFRS-compliant firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2012-2015. Consistent with our expectations, we find that equity has a significant positive relationship with auditors' price. We also find that although debt is positively related to auditors' price, the relationship is not significant. The positive relations suggest lower perceptions of firm value (or higher perceptions of firms' risk) by auditors, hence, generally, auditors' charge higher prices. This result holds even after controlling for auditor type so that it does not moderate the relationship between auditors' price and capital structure. The pooled regression results demonstrate that equity and debt affect auditors' pricing decisions differentially. Our finding indicates that auditors penalise equity financed firms more than debt financed firms, probably because the auditors perceive equity financing as inability to raise debt since equity is supposed to be a last resort in accordance with pecking order theory. It appears that the values of the firms may have suffered (indicating higher risk) since they have resorted to equity financing. We interpreted these findings to mean that financial structure conveys signals that auditors use to price their services. On the basis of our findings, we conclude that firms' financial structure conveys signals to auditors in their pricing decisions. We, therefore, recommend that auditors should monitor the capital structure of their clients to guide the auditors when charging for their services. For corporate finance managers, we recommend that they should rebalance their firms' capital structure cognisance of the fact that auditors are taking a signal from it.
This paper contributes to capital structure signaling theory (Ross, 1977; Riley, 2001 ) by examining the relation between capital structure and auditors' perceptions of firms' value (or risk) through the pricing of auditors' services. The paper is an attempt to kindle research interests on the relation between auditors' perceptions of firm value (or risk) and capital structure. The paper also contributes by providing a link between corporate finance and auditing literatures. 
